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ABSTRACT 
In the paper, we put the foundations for studying asset pricing and finance as a stochastic and 
behavioral process. In such process, preferences and psychology of agents represent the most 
important factor in the decision-making of people. Individuals have their own ways of 
acquiring the information they need, how to deal with them and how to make predictions and 
decisions. People usually also do not behave consistent in time, but learn. Therefore, in order 
to understand the behavior on the markets, a new paradigm is needed. 
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STOCHASTIC PROCESSES IN FINANCE  
AND BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Daily movements in asset prices are the main characteristic in financial markets, by now very 
hard to be forecasted with certainty. The reason for that is that it is impossible to predict the 
behavior of agents in the markets, as people use their own reasoning in the decision-making. 
Therefore, the only common knowledge in the society could be summed in the words of 
Hayek (1945, pp. 519) that “knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make never 
exist in concentrated or integrated form, but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and 
frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess.”  
 
This explains why market participants make their own predictions of the stock prices 
according to their own knowledge and their own “subjective formation of expectations,”1 
which makes such agent’s behavior and price formation impossible to forecast with certainty. 
On the other hand, such daily price movements give evidence that agents on the market agree 
that they disagree about the prices. Therefore, the fundamental question people face in their 
asset management is what is the best strategy for playing the stock market and to a what 
extent can the past movements in stock prices be used to make predictions of the future 
prices? Is it better to be focused on “fundamentals,” whatever they are and anyhow they can 
be measured, or to follow the “psychology of the market,” whatever this is? These questions 
also lie in the heart of the Markowitz’s portfolio selection (Markowitz 1952) and provided 
“answers” within two concepts: finance as a predictable deterministic process and as a non-
predictable stochastic process. 
 
To give some insights into the financial market, we present finance as a stochastic process, 
where psychology of people is the most important element. To define the stochastic process 
first, we would say that a stochastic process is a variable that evolves over time in a way that 
is at least partly random. Weather is a stochastic process. Namely, variation in temperatures is 
partly deterministic and predictable, we can expect to have warm summers and cold winters 
and that temperatures rise during the day and fall at night, and partly random and 
unpredictable.2 However, if we can predict what the temperature of the January 1 will be over 
the next two years or even what temperature we will have tomorrow, it is impossible to 
predict the price of a stock of Google over the next two years. Why is that? This is because 
weather is a (weakly) stationary process, which means that statistical properties of the 
variable are constant over time, while asset prices are non-stationary, meaning that the 
expected value can grow, or fall, without bounds. Precisely this stochastic nature of asset 
prices is what makes opportunities to individuals for increasing their wealth, but also threats 
of losing it. Therefore, individuals are taking risks. 
 
                                                 
1 See Arthur (1995). 
2 See Dixit and Pindyck (1994). 
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes finance as a stochastic process, which is 
followed with an agent-based representation of finance in Section 3. Section 4 is about how 
knowledge of people affects market behavior, giving credits to the prospect theory. Section 5 
gives some insights into the utility maximization principles under risk, while Section 6 is 
about the herd behavior. The paper ends with short conclusions. 
 
 
2 Finance as a stochastic process 
 
Markov processes 
 
The fundamental variable in asset pricing is the price. We generally say that a price is the 
information that is determined through the two processes of supply and demand. We can also 
consider the formation of prices through the bargaining processes within the matching 
framework and say that bargaining power of both agents after including their preferences 
defines the price. Of course, neither supply nor demand develops according to some 
predefined rule, but through knowledge and expectations of people, which change in time 
very irregularly. Therefore, prices also change in time in a non-predictive way (see Tab. 1). 
Note that matching is about the expectations of people and that returns just reflect changes in 
prices. 
 
TABLE 1: Stock market returns 1962-1994 
 
Security Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis Min Max 
Daily Returns 
IBM 0,039 1,42 -0,18 15,48 -22,96 11,72 
General Signal 0,054 1,66 0,01 6,35 -13,46 9,43 
Wrigley 0,072 1,45 -0,00 14,03 -18,67 11,89 
Interlake 0,043 2,16 0,72 15,35 -17,24 23,08 
Raytech 0,050 3,39 2,25 62,40 -57,90 75,00 
Ampco-Pittsburgh 0,053 2,41 0,66 8,02 -19,05 19,18 
Energen 0,054 1,41 0,27 8,91 -12,82 11,11 
General Host 0,070 2,79 0,74 9,18 -23,53 22,92 
Garan 0,079 2,35 0,72 10,13 -16,67 19,07 
Cont. Materials 0,143 5,24 0,93 9,49 -26,92 50,00 
Monthly Returns 
IBM 0,81 6,18 -0,14 3,83 -26,19 18,95 
General Signal 1,17 8,19 -0,02 4,87 -36,77 29,78 
Wrigley 1,51 6,68 0,30 4,31 -20,26 29,72 
Interlake 0,86 9,38 0,67 7,09 -30,28 54,84 
Raytech 0,83 14,88 2,73 25,70 -45,65 142,11 
Ampco-Pittsburgh 1,06 10,64 0,77 5,04 -36,08 46,94 
Energen 1,10 5,75 1,47 15,47 -24,61 48,36 
General Host 1,33 11,67 0,35 4,11 -38,05 42,86 
Garan 1,64 11,30 0,76 5,30 -35,48 51,60 
Cont. Materials 1,64 17,67 1,13 6,33 -58,09 84,78 
Source: Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997). 
 
Economists and other financial experts have since ever asked them a question, whether and in 
what extent could history be used in analyzing future price movements? Contrary to chartists 
who assume that history repeats itself, proponents of stochastic finance assume, that future 
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price movements are no easier to be forecasted than the path of a series of cumulated random 
numbers, because price changes have no memory but are independent in time.3 History fills 
people with experience, but it does not per se provide any knowledge, which could directly be 
used for estimating the future. Very frequent representation of such process is to describe it as 
a Markov chain process.  
 
A discrete time stochastic process { }tx  is said to be a Markov process, if for all 1k ≥  and all 
t , ( ) ( )1 1 1Pr , , , Prt t t t k t tx x x x x x x+ − − +=… . This means that in time 0t  an individual in state 0x  
makes a decision ta  which determines his outcome in 1t  that equals 1x . Once we know tx , all 
the previous values become unimportant. The present state is the product of the past, but only 
a current state influences to the future decisions. 
 
Markov property is in accordance with the weak form of the efficiency market hypothesis, 
that the current price of an asset involves all the past information about such asset. However, 
an important implication of a Markov process is that past returns do not warrant future 
returns. The intuition is close to that of von Mises (1996, pp. 31) that “every experience is 
something that passed away, [while] there is no experience of future happenings.” Albert 
Einstein (1923, pp. 3) once raised an interesting question: “How can mathematics, a product 
of human reason that does not depend on any experience, so exquisitely fit the objects of 
reality? Is human reason able to discover, unaided by experience through pure reasoning the 
features of real things?” and answered: “As far as the theorems of mathematics refer to 
reality, they are not certain, and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality.” 
 
 
Returns as martingales 
 
The concept of martingales in probability theory was introduced by Paul Pierre Lévy. The 
intuition of martingales tries to answer the logical question: why would someone sell the 
stock in time period t  if he knew that he would be able to get higher return in the period 
1t + ? Some answers can be found in the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), as 
people do have different knowledge and capabilities of logical reasoning, from which they 
make different expectations of the same things.  
 
A stochastic process is a martingale if ( )1t t t tE x x+ Ω = , where tΩ  denotes information matrix 
in time t , and tE  denotes expectations in time t . The equation says that in time t  an expected 
price of an asset in the next period 1tt +  as regards the set of information (or knowledge) in 
time t  equals the price in time t . Individuals that would not pursue to such rule would refuse 
to some expected profit. There would be some room for the arbitrage in a case 1t tx x+ ≠ . 
                                                 
3 Theoretically, both theories hold true. Because people make prices by their bid and ask actions, so long as all of 
them believe in Chartism, stock prices behave in that way. So long that some do not believe in the power of 
history, prices do not behave according to their historical paths. Because not everyone believes in the historical 
behavior of prices, they behave in a stochastic way. An important argument in favor of that is the changing 
economic conditions and prospects of firms. 
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Efficient stock markets are usually construed to mean that the price of a stock follows a 
martingale, while this implies an implicit assumption of the knowledge of people to be a 
common knowledge. When using martingales in asset pricing, no stock bubbles are possible.  
 
After including probabilities into the martingale equation, we get a sub-martingale equation 
( )1t t t tE x x+ Ω ≥ , which allows stock bubbles, and a super-martingale equation, respectively 
( )1t t t tE x x+ Ω ≤ , which allows stock crashes. We can also transform the sub-martingale 
equation and get, ( )1t t t t tE x x ε+ Ω = + , where tε  represents a martingale error, and super-
martingale into ( )1t t t t tE x x ε+ Ω = − , respectively. 
 
However, when using the theory of martingales it is impossible to predict future returns using 
the information matrix tΩ . Namely, the probability for assets to either rise or fall is the same. 
Barberis et al. (1998) give some arguments for that, as they argue that when some information 
becomes public, individuals respond either very insignificant or excessive, which corresponds 
to their previous expectations, and this all fills the martingale error term in any of the two 
directions. 
 
The aim of introducing the martingale measure is twofold: firstly, it simplifies the explicit 
evaluation of arbitrage prices of derivative securities, and secondly, it describes the arbitrage-
free property of a given pricing model for primary securities in terms of the behavior of 
relative prices. However, their use is only intuitive.4 
 
 
Random walk in finance 
 
Random walk describes a sequence that develops in time according to 1 1t t tx x ε+ += + , where 
1tε +  represents a white noise. A white noise is a sequence not correlated in time, with the zero 
expected value and variance 2σ ; [ ( )1 0t tE ε + = , ( )2 21t tE ε σ+ =  and ( ), 0;  t tE tτε ε τ= ≠ ].  
 
As argued by Fama (1965), random walk theory involves two separate hypotheses, one is that 
price changes are independent, and the other that price changes conform to some probability 
distribution. We say that the sequence is independent if ( ) ( )1 2Pr , , Prt t t tx x x x x− − = =… . 
 
In random walk models, in time t  the expected future value of the variable x  in time 1t +  
equals its value in time t : ( )1t t tx E x += , which can be reformulated into 1 1tt
t
xE
x
+⎛ ⎞ =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. From 
this expression we see, that the future returns of assets cannot be predicted, as the sequence 
has no historical memory that could be used to predict future returns (Fama 1965). When 
                                                 
4 A detailed survey on martingales is available in Duffie (1996). 
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treating a random walk model as a special case of an AR(1) process, then the coefficient tx  is 
unity, which implies a random walk to be a unit-root non-stationary time series.5 
 
Some modifications of the random walk hypotheses add a drift to the model. Such sequence 
of the random-walk changes into 1 1t t tx xµ ε+ += + + , where µ  represents the drift, and 
( )1t t tE x xµ += − . If we assume a stationary sequence, the expected drift is constant in time 
and represents a time trend. As is argued by Tsay (2002), it is important to understand the 
meaning of a constant term in a time series model, where for a random walk with a drift, the 
constant term becomes the time slope. 
 
 
Brownian motion in finance 
 
Brownian motion is the implementation of the random walk in a continuous time. In discrete 
time, we denoted the exogenous shock as a white noise sequence, but in the continuous time, 
a stochastic process is implemented through the set of stochastic differential equations as a 
Brownian motion. 
 
Fundamentals of the Brownian motion were set up in 1827, when a botanist Robert Brown 
observed a disordered motion of particles of pollens of plants in the water. A couple of years 
later, in 1900, Louis Bachelier used the Brownian motion to study stochastic movements in 
finance, while Albert Einstein set up the physical theory of Brownian motion in 1905. 
Einstein suggests that this motion is random and has the following properties. It has 
independent increments; the increments are Gaussian random variables; and the motion is 
continuous. Due to Norbert Wiener, Brownian motion is also known as the Wiener process, 
for which it is usually denoted as tw  and the change of the Wiener process is given as 
tw tε∆ = ∆ , with ( )0, 1 t Nε ∼ . 
 
To develop Brownian motion, let us return to the discrete-time sequence of the random walk; 
1 1t t tx x ε+ += + , where 1tε +  is the stochastic white noise sequence. If the process starts at 
0 0x =  then the equivalent representation of the process equals to 1 0 1 1t t tx ε ε ε ε+ += + + + +… , 
where ( )1 0,  1tx N t+ +∼ . Without a loss of generality, we can also write 0 1t tx ε ε ε= + + +… , 
where ( )0,  tx N t∼ . 
 
Let us now give the change of the variable x  in two different time dates, t  and s , which can 
be represented as 1 2s t t t sx x ε ε ε+ +− = + + +… , where ( )( )0,N s t− . By partitioning the change 
of the variable between the two periods into N sub-periods, we get 
                                                 
5 AR(1) process is an autoregressive process of order one and is defined as t t tx xρ ε+ += +1 1 , where tε +1  is a 
white noise with zero mean and variance σ 2 . For ρ = 1 , AR(1) process becomes a random walk process. 
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1 1 2t t t t Ntx x ε ε ε−− = + + +… , where ( )0, 1 /it N Nε ∼  and ( )1 0, 1 t tx x N−− ∼ . The limit as 
N →∞  is a continuous-time stochastic process, known as Brownian motion.6  
 
Generalized Brownian motion is of the form t tdx dt dwµ σ= + , where µ  is the drift, tw  
denotes a Brownian motion and σ  the variance.  
 
Carr and Wu (2004) strictly oppose the use of a Brownian motion in asset pricing for several 
reasons. First are stochastic shocks, where neither direction nor their size could be foreseen. 
The second argument against is the stochastic volatility in time, while variance is the principal 
variable in the Brownian motion. The last is due to the correlation between returns and 
volatility. 
 
 
3 Agent-based finance 
 
3.1 Agent-based finance in review 
 
Agent based finance give some completely new insights into the asset pricing, which are 
based on a rejection of the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium and in much smaller use of 
mathematics. Hayek and Arthur give some arguments in favor of out-of-equilibrium approach 
to economic activities. In these respect, Arthur (2006, pp. 2) argues, “Economic agents – 
banks, consumers, firms, investors – continually adjust their market moves, buying decisions, 
prices, and forecasts to the situation these moves or decisions or prices or forecasts together 
create. … individual behaviors collectively create an aggregate outcome; and they react to this 
outcome. … Behavior creates pattern; and pattern in turn influences behavior.” Almost 
seventy years before Hayek (1937, pp. 37) wrote, “The situation is, however, different with 
the plans determined upon simultaneously but independently by a number of persons. … in 
order that all these plans can be carried out, it is necessary for them to be based on the 
expectation of the same set of external events, since, if different people were to base their 
plans on conflicting expectations, no set of external events could make the execution of all 
these plans possible.” Hayek (1937, pp. 38) then adds, “It is necessary for the compatibility of 
the different plans that the plans of the one contain exactly those actions which form the data 
for the plans of the other.”  
 
The agent-based economics thus follows these Hayekian ideas as also the intellectual work of 
Herbert Simon (1955, 1957), Thomas Schelling (1978) and Robert Axelrod (1984). Some of 
the first attempts of agent-based modeling in finance were done by Garman (1976). Arifovic 
(1996) introduced genetic algorithm models into modeling exchange rates, which involves 
extensive learning of agents. On the other hand, Brock and Hommes (1998) and Brock and 
LeBaron (1996) endogenized the decision-making of people, made it the process of the 
interaction among them. Artificial stock exchange market was done within the Santa Fe 
institute (Palmer et al. 1994, LeBaron et al. 1999). Tay and Linn (2001) introduced fuzzy 
logic in agent’s learning processes. Some other models involve herd behavior Gode and 
                                                 
6 For detailed representation of a Brownian motion, see Hamilton (1994), Tsay (2002), Duffie (1996). 
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Sunder (1993), Lux (1997), and Levy et al. (1994). Odean (1999) argues of the 
overconfidence of agents. Ellsberg (1961) and Elster (1998) argue that emotions represent an 
important aspect of people’s decision-making. Barsky and DeLong (1993) link the different 
expectations of people with variation in economic growth rates. On the other hand, Smith et 
al. (1988) show the occurrence of bubbles by using asset pricing laboratory experiments. For 
the rest of the literature on agent-based asset pricing and psychology, David Hirshleifer 
(2001) is a good reference.7 
 
 
3.2 Agents in agent-based finance 
 
Preferences of agents 
 
Agents are central to the agent-based modeling. Namely, how we model agents in the game 
influences the ways in which the simulations will proceed. Therefore, omitting some 
important variables might reduce the predictive power of the simulation and results very 
much.  
 
An individual is an agent and chooses among different alternatives, by which an agent suits 
his goals. In solving this problem, an agent chooses according to what is feasible to him, what 
is desirable to him, and what is the best alternative according the desirability of an individual 
given the feasibility constraints. However, in their decision-making agents prefer both optimal 
and simple strategies, which might be in an opposition under some circumstances and which 
forces agents into the strategic decision-making. In doing that, as Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) argue, agents have strong desire to avoid the feeling of regret. However, they like to 
use efficient strategies. This means that agents are not prone of changing their strategies, 
which bring them satisfactory outcomes, despite the strategies they use do not bring them the 
highest possible outcome. When people are involved in a social interaction with others, 
Levine and Pesendorfer (2007) argue that they are prone to modify their preferences in such 
way that they select the most efficient strategies from the set of strategies of their friends. 
However, authors do not exclude the possibility that agents behave in a herd, which means 
that there is a possibility that agents do not change their behavior in order to take the most 
efficient strategies, but imitate the strategies of others no matter how efficient they are (see 
also Banerjee 1992, Lux 1995). In this respect, Aumann (1997), Rubinstein (1998), Selten 
(1975) argue for the trembling hand perfection principle. 
 
When modeling agents, it is very important, as Tesfatsion (2006) argues, that privately 
motivated agents in an agent-based framework include economic, social, biological and 
physical entities, and that agents are able to communicate with each other by using different 
techniques. It is also important to allow that artificial agents have learning capabilities and are 
able to develop in time.  
 
                                                 
7 In one of my previous work (Steinbacher et al. 2008), I simulate agents’ decision-making of their portfolios 
using a small-world network. 
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People differ in the level of knowledge they have, capacity to think and reason, skills and 
experiences, emotions, social networks they are involved in, attitude towards risk, time, and 
different types of assets, wealth, luck and many other characteristics, which all are important 
elements in building one’s preferences, which are so important for asset markets.8 Gary 
Becker (1996) argues that individuals possess two kinds of capital: personal capital and social 
capital. Personal capital of an individual involves all of the previous experiences that 
influence or determine the current knowledge and behavior of an individual, as also his future 
knowledge and behavior. On the other hand, Becker defines a social capital as the sum of all 
external effects of other people that contribute to the current and future knowledge of people 
and contribute to the decision-making of people. Of course, personal and social capitals 
represent only a part of the entire human capital of people.  
 
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) incorporate the identity of people, a person’s sense of self, into 
their decision-making processes and consider how this influences their behavior and decision-
making. We can expect that identity does affect the economic outcomes in the areas of 
consumption and savings behavior, attitude towards risk, labor relations and many other 
areas, which all affect the ways in which financial markets function. Becker (1996) sets out 
tastes of people. Besides tastes, other factors also influence people’s decision-making.  
 
Some others point out emotions of people (Ellsberg 1961 and Elster 1998). We can define 
emotions as a process or a state of a human mind, which arises from the relation of a human 
and an environment. What makes emotions so special and important in a decision-making of 
people is that they disarrange valuations, for which they should not be ignored in modeling 
behavior of agents. “Inflamed with passion, man sees the goal as more desirable and the price 
he has to pay for it as less burdensome than he would in cool deliberation.”9 However, what 
distinguishes people from animals is that people are able to rationalize their behavior. 
 
Many argue that there are also habits and (dis)incentives because of the political decisions. In 
his paper, Why do Americans Work so Much more than Europeans, Prescott (2004) argues 
that marginal labor tax rates produce a great part of the difference, as taxes have an impact on 
labor/leisure decisions of people and investment decisions of businessmen. On the other hand, 
Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) demonstrated that different economic regimes have a 
huge impact on the preferences of people. One of their findings is that people living under 
socialist regimes have much greater preferences towards redistribution, government 
intervention and higher taxes than people living in capitalist economies do have. This effect, 
as they argue, is especially strong for older cohort. This means that they are much more risk-
averse and do lack for self-initiative and individual responsibilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 On the other hand, neither are assets fully substitutes for one another. Therefore, we have heterogeneous agents 
and different types of assets. 
9 See von Mises (1996, pp. 16). 
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Autonomy of agents 
 
The most fundamental characteristic of people is action. People act and action is a purposeful 
behavior and a will put into operation, by which people satisfy their goals by employing the 
means if we take the definition of von Mises. 
 
To say that people are autonomous beings is to say that there is no upside down control over 
their decision-making, but that people make decisions by themselves. By definition, people 
always make decisions by themselves, despite the fact that others might influence to the set of 
alternatives they have available. People are target-oriented beings, where their characteristics 
and foremost capacity to think and reason represent the sources of their decision-making. 
Therefore, when they face a problem, agents make decisions in order to solve it. 
 
Even though agents behave in herds, they remain autonomous. This means that they acquire 
information, which contributes to the knowledge they have and from which they make 
expectations and make decisions according to their preferences. But their final decisions are 
always autonomous. 
 
 
Social interaction 
 
What makes an agent-based approach different from other computational and econometric 
techniques is that it allows for interaction between people, by which they improve their 
knowledge.10 These not only accords to the fact that people are not alike but also that they are 
not isolated entities, have relatives, friends, colleagues and other acquaintances with whom 
they communicate and by which they acquire new information and improve their knowledge, 
which is then used for their future decisions.11 Interaction among agents is required because 
the knowledge does not exist in a concentrated form but is dispersed, as argued by Hayek 
(1937, 1945). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Social interaction contributes to the changes of economic variables through following channels (Granovetter 
2005). A social interaction influences the ways, in which individuals receive new information. The second is 
through reward and punishment. The third is through trust. 
11 See Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) for a short discussion on cognitive methods in acquiring information. 
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FIGURE 1: Interaction among individuals 
 
 
 
Communication process is thus put into the center of studying economics as a process of 
many heterogeneous agents. Fig. 1 represents one such illustration among ten individuals. As 
we can see, it is important how many connections individuals have in such network and how 
much information and knowledge agents have.  
 
An important characteristic of any social network is the “prestige” of individuals in the 
network. Two parameters define this: centrality and betweenness (Freeman 1977). More 
connections one has with others who also have many connections, usually such individual is 
more prestigious. However, it is important that people know people who have the right 
information.  
 
For the efficient use of a social network, it is also important for individuals how capable they 
are in receiving information from others, how good the information they get from others is, 
how efficient they are to incorporate information into their knowledge and how good they use 
this in their decision-making. Another important aspect that affects the stock of individuals’ 
knowledge is how prone agents are in sharing the information and knowledge they have with 
others. People might overcome this difficulty by purchasing information on the market for 
information.  
 
 
Responsiveness and reactive learning 
 
In such social interaction, actions done by agents influence the others, while agents not only 
learn how to play such games, but also learn with whom to play. Agents that learn respond to 
the changes in their neighborhood, adapt their preferences, goals, means for achieving goals 
and strategies. These are dynamic agents. Contrary to them, static agents do not change their 
behavior in time.  
 
In choosing their connections, agents face a difficulty, as individuals are not able to know the 
characteristics of all other agents and thus cannot know, with whom to go into the relation. In 
this context, Bavelas (1950) defines a concept of centrality, which is defined through the 
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distance between particular agent on the society and others. When such distance from one 
agent to others is small, such agent is able to communicate with others very fast. Using this 
concept, Stephenson and Zelen (1989) argue that when choosing with whom to be connected, 
agents prefer individuals who have more connections with other agents. If the two agents 
want to be connected, such link must be agreed by both of them, while disagreement from 
only one agent suffices for breaking it.12 However, the size of the network and the costs of an 
individual to be part of it determine the utility of an individual he receives from the network. 
Being involved within the network with very influential individuals could bring much higher 
utility its members, while membership in the network with non-influential individuals is 
expected to bring its members smaller utility.  
 
An important element in reactive learning is the memory. Rubinstein (1998) defines it as a 
special kind of a knowledge, which defines what an agent knows at the certain time period 
about what has he knew at some previous date. And this is not perfect. People have imperfect 
recall, which limits their abilities of learning from their past behavior and actions. Imperfect 
recall is also the reason that actions of people might be inconsistent in time.  
 
Rubinstein also brings forward some of the causes for the existence of constraints on the 
information held by an agent. The acquisition of information is costly; the information 
acquired often has to be stored in the memory before its use, and the memory is not 
unbounded; while information are received through the process of interaction that also has 
some of its own limits. If other agents are not prone of sharing their knowledge to others, such 
interaction does not spread the knowledge around the network. 
 
Arthur (1991, 1992, 1994) argues that deductive reasoning does not work in making one’s 
expectations, because of the limited capabilities of people’s reasoning and logical thinking. 
Therefore, it is likely that agents use inductive reasoning instead.  
 
 
Pro-activeness of agents 
 
Individuals are target-oriented beings and they adjust their actions according to their 
preferences and expectations. “Action is will put into operation and transformed into an 
agency, is aiming at ends and goals, is the ego’s meaningful response to stimuli and to the 
conditions of its environment, is a person’s conscious adjustment to the state of the universe 
that determines his life.”13 
 
Among the most meaningful questions in agent-based economy is how agents adapt their 
strategies on the market? This could be done on several different ways. Bergh et al. (2002) 
distinguish among several different types of adaptation. Weak adaptation means that agents 
determine their action from their percepts in a static and fixed mapping. At the level of semi-
weak adaptation mapping from the percepts can be modified, while in semi-strong adaptation 
agents can change also their goals, i.e. agents might change their attitude towards risk. In 
                                                 
12 Such intuition is close to the concept of Nash equilibrium (Nash 1951). 
13 See von Mises (1996, pp. 11). 
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strong adaptation, agents can modify their intentions and manage the strategies for achieving 
their design goal. In managing their portfolios, investors’ decisions about particular 
investments appear to be considered in isolation from the remainder of the investor’s portfolio 
(Barberis et al. 2003).  
 
However, in observing others, as also when receiving new information, agents must first 
know how to identify messages of others or those on the market. Other agents are usually not 
very much inclined to deliver their knowledge to others, especially not about important issues. 
In such situations, agents might try to decode the signals and messages that other agents had 
left on the market by their actions. An obstacle in following others is that agents can observe 
the situation after the action has been done, for which they are a step behind the leaders, 
unless they find the logic of their actions. 
 
 
4 Market behavior and prospects of people 
 
In the most part of the history of modeling in economics, the question of strategic thinking, 
i.e. what people know and how this affects human behavior and the decision-making, were 
considered unimportant. Such belief was through the years embodied in the Arrow-Debreu 
general equilibrium paradigm, which is based on the premise of homogeneous agents who 
have perfect knowledge and perfect foresight. 
 
Contrary to the general equilibrium paradigm, several experimental studies provided some 
clear evidence that indifference curves are not independent of the current entitlements but 
have a kink around the current endowment level, which clearly contradicts with the 
neoclassical doctrine (List 2004). Such belief is also much closer to the reality and logical 
reasoning.  
 
Experiences and knowledge of people represent a significant element in determining value 
function of individuals through expectations of people. Kahneman and Tversky (1991) argue 
that value functions of agents are convex for losses and concave for gains. They also argue 
that value functions are initially steeper for losses than gains, which contradicts the concave 
utility function advocated by neoclassical economic theory. In addition, Mehra and Prescott 
(1985) have proved that expected utility curve cannot simultaneously explain both the small-
scale and large-scale risk attitudes. 
 
Although it is much obvious that people have different knowledge, skills, attitudes towards 
risk and time, preferences, wealth, beliefs about the same things and even interpret differently 
the same signals, for which they adopt different strategies, economists have accepted this fact 
only recently. 
 
These kinds of differences among the people all determine their behavior and, as far as stock 
market is concerned, make the volatility on the markets. In fact, Milgrom and Stokey (1982) 
argue that precisely such heterogeneous knowledge, beliefs and volatility make the trade 
possible. Their argument seems very self-explanatory, because if prices were the common 
knowledge to people, no one would be willing to pay more than the common-knowledge 
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price, and no one would be willing to sell below that price. In such world, no speculation is 
possible and there is no trade.  
 
Such omniscient world does not reflect the situation in the real world, which is populated with 
heterogeneous agents. In the real world, when agents decide to buy stocks speculative and 
more risk-dominant traders already see someone whom they will sell the stocks at higher 
prices, while long-run and more risk-averse traders expect to earn higher dividends on the 
stocks.14 Harrison and Kreps (1979) argue that such beliefs force agents to buy stocks even 
tough they believe stocks are already above their “fundamental value,” as they are convinced 
to find someone who would be willing to buy them at the higher price. Therefore, one buying 
an asset buys him an American option, which can be exercised at any time until its terminal 
date (Scheinkman and Xiong 2003). However, the time when people will exercise the option 
depends on their expectations of the future prices. In this game of incomplete knowledge, 
agents get the opportunity to earn some profit precisely from such price speculations and 
different expectations. We do not use the expression information (Stigler 1961, 1962, McCall 
1970, Akerlof 1970), but stick to Hayekian knowledge (Hayek 1937, 1945), because people 
use knowledge to make decisions, while information represent only one of the ways of 
acquiring knowledge. On the other hand, people might have the access to the information, but 
if they do not build them into their knowledge, such information access is of no use. Never 
the less, people make different predictions from having the same information, i.e. Shiller 
(2002, pp. 71) wrote, “The history of speculative bubbles begins roughly with the advent of 
newspapers.” However, Bloomfield et al. (2000) argue that investors and prices are more 
prone to overreact to unreliable than to reliable information. 
 
Stock bubbles represent one of the outcomes of such dispersion of expectations, and are later 
usually followed by stock crashes. It is very common to speak of the bubble if the price of a 
stock is above its “fundamental value;” i.e. the value of the stream of dividends to which it is 
claimed. Standard neoclassical theory precludes the existence of stock bubbles, by backward 
induction in finite horizon models, and transversality conditions in the infinite horizon 
(Santos and Woodford 1997). Despite the definition, which is quite logical, it is hard to say 
that individuals care about the fundamental value of assets they buy. People in fact only care 
in making profits, which follows to the prospects they have on markets. Abreu and 
Brunnermeier (2003) point out that bubbles have often emerged in periods of productivity 
enhancing structural changes; i.e. railway boom, electricity boom, internet and 
telecommunications boom. In such situation, variability of returns is huge, while people do 
not know the limits of the productivity change, and this enhances expectations of people.15 
 
Authors also argue that dispersion of knowledge permits bubble to grow, “despite the fact that 
the bubble bursts as soon as a sufficient mass of individuals sell out.” This occurs when the 
probability of finding someone who would be willing to purchase the stock at higher price 
vanishes. Herd behavior only deepens that process and leads to a mass downward 
overshooting effect – stock crash. This indicates that many agents do not know fundamental 
values of assets they have and do not care for that. 
                                                 
14 For intuition, see the theory of segmented markets on financial markets. 
15 We might also include recent investment boom in China. 
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One such event is when an asset has a finite maturity. Then its price tends to converge to the 
price that is quoted on an asset (Santos and Woodford 1997). The reason for that is quite 
simple: as the probability of finding someone who would be prepared to pay more for the 
stock approaches to zero as the maturity approaches to zero. In such case, the room for 
earning extra profit on incomplete knowledge is very limited and approaches zero, as the price 
and termination date become a common knowledge. 
 
Therefore, an asset buyer acquires an American type option to sell the asset if other agents 
have more optimistic beliefs. When stock price increases the probability that a an asset holder 
will find someone who will be willing to pay for a stock more than he had paid approaches 
zero while the probability of a stock crash increases. In such situation, an expected profit of 
the transaction is likely to become negative, while the cost of an uncertainty rises. 
Consequently, the willingness of agents to buy stocks shrinks, and they all want to sell. 
Agents might also start minimizing their loss. At this point, the aversion of prospects of 
agents, especially of their eventual loss, enters into their decision-making.16,17 Loss aversion 
stipulates that agents are much more sensitive to reductions in wealth than to increases. 
Psychology of agents in their decision-making lies in the center of the prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979). 
 
Motivated with the idea of prospect theory and the fact that people overweigh outcomes that 
are considered certain (Allais 1953), Thaler (1980) identified an “endowment effect.” It has 
been proved that goods that can be lost or given up are highly valued by individuals than 
when the same goods are evaluated as a potential gain (Kahneman et al. 1990, 1991, Tversky 
and Kahneman 1991).18 This implies that agents behave much more careful when buying 
risky stocks, as they do not know whether stocks will bring them profit or induce a loss. As 
expected, Kahneman and Tversky showed that in the positive domain the certainty effect 
contributes to a risk-averse preference for a sure gain over a larger gain that is merely 
probable, while in the negative domain, the same effect leads to the risk-seeking preference 
for a loss that is merely probable over the a smaller loss that is certain. When buying shares 
agents face bigger uncertainty. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) argue that the problem of 
matching buyers and sellers is most accurate in trading with shares of small firms, which are 
usually characterized with high bid-ask spreads and very small trading volumes. Such high 
spreads decrease probabilities that options are exercised and thus increase the uncertainty of 
selling the stock further. 
 
We can demonstrate such simple prospects of an agent iA  as ( ) ( )1 2, ; ,1p p pπ π π= −  where  
 
                                                 
16 Due to lower trading volumes bid-ask spread increases and there is a problem of matching buyers and sellers. 
17 See Kahneman and Tversky (1979) for the intuition on prospect theory. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) also 
show that most people will reject a gamble with even chances to win and lose, unless the possible win is at least 
twice the size of the possible loss. However, agents on financial markets are usually more risk-dominant than 
average person is. 
18 In 1738, Bernoulli attempted to explain why people are generally more risk-averse and why risk-aversion 
decreases with increasing wealth (see Bernoulli 1954).  
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In the response function of an agent 1π  defines the profit that an agent receives if he is able to 
sell the stock after he bought it and p  is the probability of such outcome, while 2π  is the loss 
if he does not succeed in selling the stock. We can say that p  denotes the probability whether 
SP  is higher than PP , or not. SP  denotes the price at which one sells a stock and is stochastic, 
while PP  the price at which the stock was purchased. This price is known and stochastic, for 
which it causes uncertainty. Finally, t  denotes transaction costs and other related costs (e.g. 
taxes, fees, etc.). The above general decision function of an agent is not stationary in time. 
 
Thaler and Johnson (1990) argue that prior outcomes do affect the ways agents behave in the 
future. They conclude that after winning some gambles, individuals become less risk-averse 
and get more prone of taking more risk. 
 
People also possess the ability to learn. The ability to learn is the most important ability of the 
people by which they improve their future decisions. In economics, “learning-by-doing” is a 
very popular expression, describing the process where people improve their skills when 
repeatedly perform the same work. Pretty much the same is within the human behavior, “A 
child who is being bullied learns either to fight better or to run away,” as Skyrms and 
Pemantle (2000, pp. 9340) argue. Besides, in the process of acquiring their knowledge people 
also use social networks, which enable them, through social interaction with others, to learn 
from experiences of their colleagues and friends, thus improve their knowledge. 
 
Despite the ability to learn, negative outcomes produce fear within people. Therefore, agent 
who suffers a loss is much more sensitive to additional setback, which increases his risk-
aversion. After the loss, people tend to avoid from playing risky gambles in the future that 
they would otherwise take. Contrary to that, Thaler and Johnson introduced a “house money 
effect,” meaning that agents have greater willingness to gamble with the money that was 
recently won, where the unpleasantness of an eventual loss of recently won money may be 
diluted by aggregating it with the earlier gain. Their finding rejects the assumption that people 
maximize their utility in every moment. 
 
The other determinant that should be considered in the behavior of people is represented by 
how prone they are to changing their behavior and some habits and practices. People usually 
do not like to change their behavior very often, and once they form strong beliefs, they are 
often too inattentive to acquire such knowledge that would contradict their current knowledge 
and beliefs. Therefore, once people get convinced that one investment strategy is more 
lucrative than another is, they may not sufficiently attend to evidence suggesting the strategy 
is flawed, i.e. never dissuaded once convinced (Rabin 2003, Osborne and Rubinstein 1990).  
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When faced with the decision under uncertainty, people usually value simplicity (Rubinstein 
1998). This means that when choosing among different alternatives, people like to have as 
efficient strategies as possible that would best serve their goals, while on the other hand, 
selected strategies should be as simple as possible. Or, not too complex. Among reasons, why 
agents prefer simplicity, Rubinstein argues that complex plans might easier break down, 
either are more difficult to be learnt, or may require some additional time to be implemented. 
Therefore, agents face a tradeoff, while the belief in one’s own talents and abilities to adopt 
and execute one strategy is an important element. Every change represents a risk to people. 
 
 
5 Decision-making under risk 
 
It is in the nature of people to think and reason, and make decisions in order to be successful 
and happy. In doing this, people act by pursuing their rational self-interest. Everything in the 
nature has to act according to their rational self-interest or it dies. Taking a lion, a deer and a 
tree for the example, we see that a lion has to hunt or starve, while a deer has to run from the 
hunter or be eaten, and a tree has to find the way to the sunshine in order to survive.19 In his 
Wealth of Nation Adam Smith made a comparison of the “benevolent butcher,” who is 
interested only in selling the bread to people, while people are interested only in having bread 
to eat. Therefore, the utilitarian principle of the “invisible hand” is immanent to the people 
and the social structure is the outcome of countless actions of individuals pursuing their 
rational self-interest. 
 
A significant fact in people’s decision-making is the uncertain future. This is because actions 
of individuals do not follow to some deductive system. “If people knew the future, they would 
not have to choose and would not act, but would be like an automaton,” said von Mises. For 
this, “the uncertainty of the future is already implied in the very notion of action.”20 
Therefore, the most that can be attained with regard to reality is the use of probabilities. 
 
To say that people implicitly consider the uncertainty when making decisions does not mean 
that people do not follow their rational self-interest and that they do not maximize their utility. 
It is not logical to say that people do something in order to be worse off. That would be a 
contradiction in terms. Namely, everything has its own reason. A psychotic behavior of 
people that do perceive the reality on a specific way aims to maximize the utility of such 
individuals as well, despite others might consider such behavior irrational. Therefore, it is 
oriented towards satisfying the utility of a psychotic individual. 
 
Ramsey (1928) was among the first to model individuals’ utility as the concave function of 
consumption, giving the rise of numerous of such concave functions. It is misleading to argue 
that people maximize only their consumption, as they also value their leisure and the 
uncertainty, at least.21 Taking risk is not costless. Utility function is also not a static process, 
                                                 
19 See Rand (1967) for the concept of rational self-interest. 
20 See von Mises (1996, pp. 105). 
21 For instance, in the hierarchy of people’s needs, Maslow (1943) puts consumption at the bottom, while self-
actualization and self-esteem on the top. 
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as is usually assumed by neoclassical economists, but is dynamic and changing, which 
reflects the fact that people learn and gain experience, which might alter the attitude of their 
preferences. 
 
The next significant determinant of people’s decision-making is rationality. Rationality can be 
defined as a statement about the choice of people, while people behave rational if they choose 
the best response according to their beliefs and preferences. It is obvious that rationality is by 
definition incorporated into people’s behavior. It is logically that if a  is preferred to b  and b  
to c , than also a  should be preferred to c . If it somehow happens that c  is preferred to a , 
then such individual faces a problem of self-contradictory “scale of value,” as a result of the 
deficiency of presence of mind, as the two actions are never synchronous and the value 
judgments not immutable.22 Anyway, such person behaves rationally. 
 
In the world of selfish individuals, a concept of Nash equilibrium (Nash 1951, Harsanyi 1967) 
is very intuitive in explaining behavior of individuals. It says that each individual’s strategy 
choice is a best response to the strategies played by their rivals. Weakness of Nash 
equilibrium is that it assumes that individuals be right in their predictions, which means that it 
does not allow for incomplete knowledge, but despite that the concept us such cannot be 
denied. 
 
In the world of incomplete knowledge, risk-taking is indispensable. Therefore, throughout this 
process of risk-taking the question of importance among selfish agents becomes not only who 
knows what, but also what people know about what others know, and what people know 
about what others know about what others know, etc (Samuelson 2004). This means that 
agents in the game appear in each other’s equilibrium strategies (Nash 1951), but a little 
contrary to the concept of Nash, as they have incomplete knowledge. Precisely incomplete 
knowledge about the knowledge of others leads us to the point where there is no one else to 
buy a share. Therefore, when deciding whether to buy a share or not, agents reason whether 
they will find someone who would be willing to buy such share at the higher price. In such a 
game, agents do not think of the fundamental price of stocks neither whether the price is 
overvalued or not, but reason only what are the abilities to succeed in selling a share after it 
has been bought. Therefore, despite they all would know that the price is overvalued they do 
not know what strategies would others adopt, and therefore still see the opportunity to exhaust 
some profit in this period of finding the upper limit. Finding a peak is the most decisive 
moment of such game and those who are more successful in this, or even luckier, end with 
some profit, while others suffer a loss. For an infinite small agent, finding a peak is only a 
matter of luck and a gambling. At the peak, being in a short position is a desired strategy. 
 
 
6 Herd behavior in people’s decision-making 
 
Specialization among people plays an important role in their life. It also influences the ways 
in which people make decisions. Namely, in their decision-making people are many times 
influenced by the decisions of others, to which specialization of knowledge leads. Adam 
                                                 
22 See von Mises (1996). 
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Smith was among the first who emphasized the productivity of people as a byproduct of the 
division of labor and specialization of individuals. For our purpose, the two phenomena that 
arise from the specialization of knowledge are of a special interest: herd behavior and 
informational cascade.23 
 
Keynes (1936) argues that people often do not trust their own knowledge and experiences, for 
which rather stick to some outside authority. Contrary to Keynes, Fischhoff et al. (1977) 
incorporate overconfidence into modeling human behavior, which leads to overestimation of 
the precision of their knowledge and abilities. Individuals become more overconfident after 
they have won some gambles. And in this context Odean (1999) adds that not only are people 
too willing to act when having too little information, but also they are also too willing to act 
when they are wrong. 
 
Especially when faced with the lack of their own knowledge people behave as “second-hand” 
members of some social group, and are led by the decisions that were based on the reason and 
the knowledge of others whose knowledge they value higher then theirs own. Such “second-
hand” agents have intent of copying others, while they act only after observing the behavior 
of these agents-leaders.24 In pursuing such strategy of following some authority, agents face 
the problem of selecting the person to follow. Welch (2000) argues that the purchase 
recommendations for individual stocks by security analysts have a significant positive 
influence on the recommendations of other analysts, while the incentive to adopt behavior of 
one another agent increases in the number of previous adopters. Graham (1999) adds that 
analysts are more likely to herd when they are of a high reputation or have low ability, or if 
there is recognized public information that is inconsistent with the analyst's private 
information. Herding is also common when informative private signals are positively 
correlated across analysts.  
 
An important factor in studying herd behavior is that it is not that leaders can overcome the 
uncertainty of the future, but second-hand individuals believe that due to their knowledge and 
experience, the variance of leaders should be far smaller than it is their own. For this reason, 
they choose to follow them. However, herd behavior leads to stock bubbles that are later 
followed by the stock crashes. “The reason is that capital gains lead to increasing actual 
returns. Once infection has reached the overwhelming majority of speculative traders, a 
change in basic sentiment occurs because the exhaustion of the pool of potential buyers 
causes price increases to diminish.”25 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 While the terms informational cascade and herd behavior are used interchangeably in the literature, Smith and 
Sørensen (2002) emphasize that there is a significant difference between them. An informational cascade is said 
to occur when individuals ignore their private information in their decision-making, whereas herd behavior 
occurs when individuals make an identical decision, not necessarily ignoring their private information. Thus, 
informational cascade implies a herd, but herd does not imply an informational cascade. We do not distinguish 
between the two and will use only the expression herd behavior in the sequel. 
24 See Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Bikhchandani et al. (1992), Banerjee (1992, 1993). 
25 See Lux (1995, pp. 893). 
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7 Conclusion 
 
In the paper, we put some arguments in favor of stochastic and behavioral finance. Namely, 
individuals make their predictions and decisions through a very complex system that is hard 
to be explained only through the set of differential equations. On the other hand, experiments 
have demonstrated that people usually also do not behave consistent in time, but use different 
ways of strategic thinking and reasoning, instead. This is especially true when dealing their 
wealth, which make the understanding of price movements much more complex. Although 
many attempts have been tried to define asset pricing through a kind of a stochastic process, i. 
e. Brownian motion or martingale, volatilities on the market indicate that new paradigm is 
needed.  
 
Therefore, the question is what is to be done? Herbert Simon (1997, pp. 431) delivered the 
answer that “… economists must receive new kinds of research training, much of it borrowed 
from cognitive psychology and organization theory… [and] must learn how to obtain data 
about beliefs, attitudes, and expectations.” The paper is a step in that direction. 
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